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Economies
Developmentin the Transition
Southeast
Asia:
Explication, Assessment,
Policy
Implications

Marketing
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and

CliffordJ. Shultz,II and,AnthonyPecotich
Geopolitical events haveforced many countries in SoutheastAsia to transformfrom
centrally planned to market-orientedeconomies. The authors review the literatureand
introducea model to help explain theforces andfactors that seem to affect the success of
SoutheastAsian transitionpolicies. The authors submitthat thoughSoutheastAsian
gradualismor constrainedcapitalism continues to produce positive macroeconomicresults
and consumptionopportunities,more expansive reformpolicies eventuallycould be
requiredif these transitioneconomies are to continue to prosper and enhance the welfare of
their people. Theyconclude by discussing marketingimplicationsand directionsforfurther
research.

Impressive growthratesamongthecountriesundergoing

economic transformationin Southeast Asia have led
many policy analysts, investors,and marketingplanners
to conclude that a SoutheastAsian model of gradualtransition-controlled economies guided toward the market by
authoritariangovernments-might be optimal for economic
development. These countries-Cambodia, China,1 Laos,
Myanmar,2 and Vietnam-have
strengthened their
economies and on balance have enhanced living conditions
for their people. Indeed, the "radical"policy decisions to
make economies market oriented and in turn initiate farreaching systemic changes have affected many consumers,
marketinginstitutions,and entire societies profoundly(e.g.,
see Shultz, Belk, and Ger 1994). These policy changes in a
Southeast Asian context, and the pace and scope of their
outcomes, are sources of keen interestand debate (cf. Asian

IThroughoutthe text we refer to China, which is an influentialplayer in
regional policymaking. The categorizationof China as part of Southeast
Asia can be problematicbecause its boundariesextend to NortheastAsia.
However, labels such as SoutheastAsia, East Asia, Pacific Rim, and Pacific
Basin frequentlyare used withoutclear, definitive, enumerateddistinction,
and uniquedistinctionsoccur or have occurredonly in the cases of formal
alliances or associations such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), or Asian
Free Trade Association (AFTA). Our decision, therefore, is based on the
desire to avoid the more cumbersome"East and Southeast Asia" description and to recognize China for its contributionsto and evolving role in
Southeast Asian policy and marketingdevelopment.
2FormerlyBurma.
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Survey 1996; Belk and Zhou 1986, 1987; Doner 1991;
Hewison, Robison, and Rodan 1993; Kapstein 1996; Kopits
and Offerdal 1994; Ljunggren 1993; Naya and Tan 1995;
Robison and Goodman 1996).
We believe they also warrantfurtherexaminationvis-atvis marketingand publicpolicy. Therefore,ourpurposeis to
synthesize the researchfindings and much of the academic,
popular business, and institutionalliteratureon economies
in transition with the intent to (1) frame the zeitgeist on
reform policies and marketingin transitioneconomies, particularly in those countries that adhere to the Southeast
Asian model; (2) illuminatewhat we believe are some compelling issues during economic and social transformation;
and (3) provide a rudimentarymodel that should generate
further discussion and research efforts on marketing and
public policy.

Policy Reformand Economic
Transition
The end of the Cold War signaled the end of "conflict
between extreme forms of progressivism-socialism and
neo-classical capitalism"(Sakakibara1995, p. 8). Both of
these ideologies, which emerged from the traditionalfeudal
systems, emphasized the increase and fair distributionof
material wealth as major social objectives (Fukushima
1995; Sakakibara1995). The aim, therefore, was to solve
the same economic problemand the controversyemanating
from the different approachesto its resolution:The socialists emphasized state planning;the neo-classicists, the market. The collapse of the Easternbloc not only indicated the
failure to deliver an acceptable standardof living to consumers, but also suggested that the world was entering a
new era of economic competitionand cooperation(Weidenbaum 1995). To survive in this new age, nationswill have to
find structuresfor social and economic interactionthat will
allow for compromise and accommodatethe needs of multiple interests. The political orientation and ensuing economic policies, as the world shifts from military to eco-
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nomic competition, must be moderatedby maturepragmatism, in which "toleranceratherthan impetuousbelief, balance ratherthan progress,are respected"(Sakakibara1995,

p. 8).

This pragmatismand a desire for accommodationare perhaps most clearly visible in the transition economies of
Southeast Asia, as the leaders of these states struggle to
bring prosperityto their people and to maintainpower. The
shift away from orthodoxMarxist-Leninism,however, was
not the resultof a grandand altogetherwillful conversion to
capitalism;more accurately,the decision was thruston them
by a combinationof economic and sociopolitical forces and
policies that renderedSoutheast Asia a region of disparate
economic winners and losers. The obvious losers were
Myanmarand the Indochinesecountriesof Cambodia,Laos,
and Vietnam;all cases in which the ruling authoritieswere
committed to economic management by central planning.
By the mid-1980s, war devastation and/or economic mismanagementhad renderedthese countries among the poorest in the world, or to paraphraseLee Kuan Yew, the world
simply left them behind (Zakaria 1994). The conditions
were so severe that the World Bank and other international
agencies became unable to make reliableestimates, even of
how poor they had become. The command economies
unquestionablycontributedto the deplorablepoverty. It was
particularlygalling for the traditionallyproudand xenophobic Vietnamese to see countries such as Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia catapulttheir economies and living conditions so far beyond Vietnam that it will take at least 30
years to catch up.3
Nevertheless, these nations have made reformist moves
towardthe marketsystem with the hope of achievinga peaceful transitionto affluence-typically indicatedby increasesin
economic growth, living standards,and the emergence of a
consumer society more generally-without the cataclysmic
loss of control, conflict, and internecinewarfareapparentin
partsof EasternEurope(Shultz,Pecotich,and Le 1994). The
difficultyof the task is compoundedby the need to change an
establishedsystem while loweringtradebarriersand encouragingforeigninvestment.Forexample,before 1979Chinawas
closed largelyto the outsideworld,andthe "opendoor"policy
of 1978 usheredin a new era leadingto a freeingof the market
(Blaho 1994; Glassman 1991). The complexitiesof this task
have been well describedby Marerand Zecchini(1991, p. 3):
of theseeconomicsystemsis, by its nature
The transformation
andscale, a taskandan effortwithoutprecedentin economic
history.The conditionsof economicdistressthatcharacterize
thesecountriesat the beginningof the transitionmakethe task
all themoreurgent.Thelackof anadequatebodyof knowledge
fromwhichto drawguidanceaddsto the complexityof their
No 'Western'economicexperiencecanbe applied
undertaking.
directlyto solve these problemssince they have uniqueand
ecorelatedto thecommand-type
characteristics
unprecedented
that
economicstructures
nomicmechanismandthe particular
havedevelopedoverseveraldecades.

3Thirtyyears is the number frequently mentioned by optimistic Vietnamese policymakers (e.g., Tran Quang Nghiem 1996); it is sometimes
mentionedin casual conversationas the 2025 plan-that is, to catch up to
the rest of SoutheastAsia by the year 2025.

This lack of knowledge is not the only impediment to
progress.Anothermajorproblemstems from the entrenched
natureof the extant system and the social structurewithin
which it exists. Although these governmentscould be honestly seeking a formulato deliver a higherstandardof living
to theirpeople, the political realitymakes trueprogressdifficult. Thatis, a governmentthatchampionsreformand transition must producetangible results,but radicalmeasuresand
the subsequentimmediateausterityoften lead to erosion of
public support.This turn of events then can lead to newer,
regressivepolicies thatconflict with the precarioustransition
policies. Anotherscenario might include implementationof
ineffectual policies specifically implementedto mollify the
variouspoliticalfactions,usually hard-linerswithinCommunist parties and/or established bureaucrats who disdain
change,accompanyingloss of status,andthe reestablishment
of the bourgeoisie.Forexample,aftermakingsteadyprogress
Vietnamhas slowed reform.Authoritiestherehave sentenced
to jail Do TrungHieu andHoangMinhChinh(leadingfigures
in the CommunistParty)for demandinggreaterpartyopenness and in so doing hope to send a warningto otherpossible
reformers (Schwarz 1995). Even more recent regressive
activities such as the "social evils campaign" in Vietnam
(VietnamBusiness Journal 1996), Cambodia's Borgia-like
political in-fighting(e.g., The Economist 1995a;Lizde 1996;
Ross 1994) or the ongoing surveillance/mistrustof Aung
Sang Suu Kyi in Myanmar(e.g., TheEconomist1995b,c) are
testimonyto the volatilityassociatedwith transition.
Irrespective of these and other difficulties within the
region, the extraordinaryeconomic progress of Southeast
Asia as a whole has been documented well (e.g., Solomon
1994). The full magnitudeof the changes has been described
as the rise of the "new economic world order"(Schwab and
Smadja 1994, pp. 40-41). This advancementhas led many
policy analysts to conclude that there indeed might exist a
Southeast Asian model of development, previously introduced as a controlled economy under the aegis of authoritariangovernmentstransformingto a more market-oriented
economy; some even suggest that, given the end of progressivism, this approachcould be the template for economic
developmentin the future(cf. Bergerand Hsin-Huang1988;
Goh Keng Swee 1995; MacIntyre1994; Wade 1992; World
Bank 1993).
We referto this model as gradualism,or constrainedcapitalism, because of interventionistpolicies implementedby
authoritariangovernmentsthat tend to managethe pace and
scope of the marketeconomy. Gradualismpermitsstate corporations to reform themselves and therefore to function
like privateenterpriseswhile concurrentlyencouragingprivate businesses and a consumer culture.The objective is to
transformslowly and with political stability, and in time, as
stated most clearly by Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van
Kiet (1994, p. 7), "To make our people rich." Furthermore,
gradualismincorporatesthe core values demonstratedby the
other economically successful Southeast Asian nations:
respect for centralauthority,teamwork,outwardorientation
and respect for market forces, macroeconomic discipline,
guided interventionism,and social/political/economic harmony (e.g., Blackburn1994; Petri 1993, 1995). And despite
the fact that these countries are still poor, trends indicate
they have made sufficient headway in a shortperiodof time,
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Foundationsfor Explicationof SoutheastAsianTransitionEconomies
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leading to the conclusion the "template"argument could
have some validity.

Explicationof SoutheastAsian
TransitionEconomies
To preface this section we encouragereadersto note that a
veracious evaluation of Southeast Asian transition
economies cannot be accomplishedby examining any part
of any social system in isolation. To focus on any nation
without a referenceto the wider aspects of the environment
would distort and misrepresentthe events. Therefore, it is
necessary to focus on the region as a whole and to extract
those overarchingthemes thatare critical to the explanation
,of the progress.The nations vary, for example, on the basis
of culture, language, and political systems, and there are
deep historicalanimositiesamong them. In some cases these
animosities are so embeddedin nationalpsyches thatfurther
violent disputesare possible (Wanandi1994), but the forces
for integrationand cooperationare also strong and are energized furtherby the pragmaticattitudesof the currentleaders, many of whom sharea regionalvision. The trendwithin
the region is toward international accommodation as
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) expands
and new tradeblocs such as the GreaterMekong Subregion
emerge (Brimble 1994), even though the conditions within
many nations have not been characterizedby political harmony. It remainssomewhat ironic thatdespite greatertolerance and a movement toward regional integration,various
forms of internal turmoil and repression remain problematic. (For a thoughtfuldiscussion of authoritarianism,development, and repressionin a particularSoutheastAsian context, see Kyi May Kaung 1995.) Nevertheless, the movement toward regional cooperation and mutual prosperity

Welfare
Outcomes
1.Consumers
2.

System
Executive
1. Knowledge
2. Motivation
3. Implementation

Sociey

3.Nations

MarketintSystem
1. Consumers
2. Infrastructure
3. Performance

marches forward (e.g., Chia and Pecotich 1988; Pecotich
and Chia 1992).
In the following section we discuss the foundations of
Southeast Asian progress that sustain the march. Figure 1
illustratesthe foundationsas a networkof forces or systems.
Each of them in turnhas underlyingfactors that are critical
to the long-term sustainable welfare of societies, nations,
consumers, and regional integration.The arrows illustrate
that each interactswith the others and that this interaction
process is dynamic.However, thoughall the forces are interactive and contributeto explication, some forces are more
basic thanothers.Consequently,they are arrangedin Figure
1 from more to less rudimentaryand left to right, respectively. The orderof discussion is organizedaccordingly.

NaturalForces
Initial discussion of the model begins with naturalforces
because geographic attributes, natural resources, and
weatherpatternsfundamentallydeterminepolicy and resulting marketand consumeroutcomes. The intrinsichabitability and naturalwealth of Southeast Asia have spawned and
nurturedcivilizations for millennia. Indeed, its climate and
resources have incited intense competition and colonial
interventionto exploit the vast riches of the region and set
in motion the political machinationsthat led to present-day
transition. That is, colonialism, the struggle for control
among Marxist and capitalist powers, the rise of nationalism, and the eventual administrativewithdrawalof colonial
and occupying powers would not have occurredunless there
were extraordinaryresourcesfor which people were willing
to fight and makeequally extraordinarysacrifices to control.
This fact might not be appreciatedfully, and we address it
not only because of its historical relevance, but because of
its importanceto currentand futurepolicy decisions.
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More specifically, each transitioncountry varies in the
condition and capacity of its naturalresources,which form
importantgeographic or naturalconstraintsthat affect the
economy, markets,and consumers. Consider, for example,
China's size, topography, and arable land-to-population
ratio, which raise questions about this nation's ability to
administerits economy and feed its people (Chang 1995;
Swanson 1996). Vietnam has a coastline longer than that
found between Seattle and San Diego yet is only 30 kilometers wide in some sections. Its capital, in the far North, is
separatedby dense rain forest from its commercial hub in
the South, thus makingdifficult coordinatedadministration;
its extensive coastline renders impossible the control of
smuggling-which is a growing problem for the Vietnamese government (Ruderman 1996). Cambodia, the
region's countrywith perhapsthe most delicate agricultural
system, is at the mercyof capriciousweatherpatterns(Asian
Development Bank 1994) and its position between the
larger and more powerful Thailand and Vietnam have
shaped and reshaped its borders for centuries (St. John
1995). Laos is a landlockedcountrywith the largestland-topopulationratio in Southeast Asia (Economist Intelligence
Unit 1995). It is especially dependenton Thailand,Vietnam,
and China for access to export markets and is frequently
viewed by its neighborsas little more thana distributionlink
in the region, which in turn raises fears among Lao leaders
about sustainable national sovereignty (Ardrey and Shultz
1996). Myanmar is second in land mass only to China
among Southeast Asia's continentalnations, and its topographyand climate are almost as varied. It is wedged among
India, China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos, and its
"crossroads"location has given it a multiethnicpopulation
with separatist inclinations (Central Intelligence Agency
1994; Economist Intelligence Unit 1994a).
Althoughthe resourcesare plentiful and varied,centuries
of exploitation and tremendouspopulation pressures have
led inevitablyto degradation.The condition of the environment presents serious problems in most of the nations and
affects their ability to enhance and sustain life quality. The
conditions of some of the region's commercial hubs (e.g.,
Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh) alreadyhave reachedcrisis proportionsand require immense investment in urban
renewal. Further economic progress will lead to greater
stresses on air and water quality, traffic congestion, forest
and fishery depletion, and soil erosion, thus creating a
growth-preservationconundrum for these nations. Economic progress and materialismhave costs, but leaders in
the region, though makingpublic statementsin favor of pollution control and conservation,privately state they cannot
afford comprehensiveenvironmentalprotectionprograms.4
Political exigency demands economic growth. So, geography, natural forces, and rapidly accelerating consumption
pressures increasingly will play a role in Southeast Asian
policy decisions, as long as there are decisions to make.

Political Forces
The political systems in the region are now guided more by
the realpolitikof pragmatismand less by ideological orien4Based on a series of in-countryinterviews by the authorswith government leaders.

tations. Ideology, however, continues to influence the range
of personal liberties, macroeconomic policies, financial
allocations, social change, and the extent of interventionin
other systems. Therefore, we have placed political, macroeconomic, and social forces in close proximity to one
anotherin Figure I and between naturalforces and systems
of administration. We discuss political forces here first
because the most significant impediment to even greater
reformstill emanatesfrom ideological constraints.
Hesitancyand uncertaintyon the partof governmentleaders areoften due to the necessity to justify the reformswithin
the constraintsof Marxistorthodoxy.It is perhapsinevitable
that party ideologues will struggle to maintain the status
quo. In some cases the strugglecan take the form of archival
"discoveries,"which reveal that nationalist/Marxistleaders
such as Ho Chi Minh might have advocatedcapitalistprinciples all along (Karnow 1996, p. 34). However, the desire
to retain control, nationalism,and genuine concern for the
citizenry are driving forces behind reform.These contingencies can lead to furtherweakening and perhapseven abandonment of the orthodoxy, especially among the younger
members of the various ruling governments in the region.
We have conducted numerous field interviews with Communist party members from Vietnam, Laos, and the coalition government of Cambodia and Myanmar's State Law
Order and Restoration Council (SLORC). Some form of
abandonmentis a common theme, but many of the most talented mid-level partymemberscommittedto reformunderstand that to press too far would not be in the best interests
of either the process or personalcareermanagement.So, the
trendhas been for governmentsto invoke a systemic market
socialism-in other words, to reform from within, which
entails accepting market forces and consumer culture, but
maintainingcontrol and rejectingpolitical pluralism.
Implicit in reformpolicies is the understandingthat party
labels, icons, and symbols are becoming irrelevant. The
Communistpartiesof Vietnam,China,Laos, Cambodia,and
the SLORCof Myanmarall have acceptedthe importanceof
market economics to the success of their countries'
economies and citizens' welfare. More cynically, the desire
to maintainthe strangleholdon power is likely to lead to further reforms. Consequently, the Communist parties and
SLORC increasingly mirrorthe more capitalist parties that
dominatepolitics and influenceeconomic trendsin the other,
more prosperouscountriesof Asia (cf. Gold 1986; Haggard
and Cheng 1987; Johnson 1987; Robison and Goodman
1996; Shultz and Le 1993). Ultimately,their legitimacy and
longevity depend on economic growth and enhancementof
life quality, and because those very outcomes are becoming
increasinglyevident, the reformprocess continues.
China frequentlyis seen as the vanguard.It is difficult to
envision other Southeast Asian nations following policy
changes forged by China, their historical rivals, but economic success and increased social well-being inevitably
attract the attention of leaders in countries pushed to the
brinkof economic disaster.Vietnam'sdoi moi or renovation
(e.g., Dapice and Vallely 1996; Do Duc Dinh 1993; Fforde
1993; General Statistics Office 1996; Pike 1992; Shultz
1994), Laos' chitanakanmai or new economic mechanism
(e.g., Bourdet 1994; Economist Intelligence Unit 1995; Lao
Peoples Democratic Republic 1995; Rigg 1995), and Cam-
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bodia's post-Paris Peace Accord5 (e.g., Prasso 1994; St.
John 1995) all at least have examined and in many cases
attempted to follow China's lead. The ruling generals of
SLORC now have recognized the utility of economic liberalization, and policy incentives currently are producing
modest if not overwhelmingchanges and positive consumer
outcomes (cf. Abel 1996; The Economist 1996; Steinberg
1993; Sundhausen1995; Thein and Than 1995).
Another political trend in the region is democratization.
The noncommunist nations such as Singapore, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia have moved in the direction of
greaterdemocracy,and as institutionsdevelop, this augursa
more prosperousand peaceful future.The transitionnations,
in between bouts of repressionand motivated by the disintegrationof EasternEuropeand the formerSoviet Union (cf.
Pecotich, Renko, and Shultz 1994; Shultz, Pecotich, and Le
1994), also are democratizingtheir institutionsslowly. The
pragmaticnatureof the political leadershipsuggests thatthis
trend toward democratizationwill continue. We hasten to
add that the trendis not tantamountto Westernconceptions
of democracy. Rather the political and economic systems
are more open than they were, and thus transitionseems to
be inching from abject repressiontoward a middle-ground
consumer culture:Citizens likely will be able to purchase
many kinds of goods and services from around the globe,
congregate and travelfreely, and improvetheir materiallot,
generally, so long as they do not challenge the authorityof
the government (cf. Williams 1992). In effect, we are
increasingly seeing a "softened authoritarianism"(Ljunggren 1992). The democratizationmovement is measured
and incremental,and thoughit is generally moving forward,
it is analogous to a pendulumin that it occasionally swings
backward.
Internalpolitical friction continues to hinder the reform
movement. Support for reform is not unanimous among
leaders, whose most criticalagendais to retaintheir monopoly on power. Conservatives know that macroeconomic
prosperityis by no means the only outcome of reform policies. These policies also have changed the face of transition
societies and threatento bring even greater social change
characterizedby corruption,a widening gap between rich
and poor, Western ideas on individualrights, and cries for
political freedom that are imported along with investment
capital and technology (Shultz, Ardrey,and Pecotich 1995).
In addition to cries for political reform are pressures to
embrace other ideas espoused by the world community,
including respect for intellectual property rights, human
rights, pollutioncontrol,environmentpreservation,and sustainable growth. Flagrantdisregardfor these issues eventually could force the world community to ostracize these
governments,thoughthe currentpolitical winds do not suggest that scenario is tenable. Economic and trade sanctions,
however, would retarddevelopment,thus forcing regression
to purely agrarianeconomies. This outcome would be especially troublesomebecause externalpressuresand the afore5Although transformingfrom a centrally planned, Marxist economy,
Cambodia's situation is least reminiscentof China's, as its turning point
was brokeredby the United Nations and resulted in an open election and
the establishmentof the Royal Governmentin 1993. Unfortunately,Cambodia is also the least stable country in the region.
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mentionedenvironmentalconstraintsalso would cause agriculturalgrowth to peak in the near futureand would strain
the productioncapacity of forests, soil, and fisheries.
Clearly, political decisions ultimatelyaffect many sectors
and systems. Policies emanatingfrom the softened authoritarianismof the Southeast Asian leadershiphave enhanced
economic development, in many instances life quality, and
for some consumers even social mobility. Irrespective of
whether this authoritarianismis anchoredon the "right"or
the "left," Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
morerecently,China,Vietnam,andCambodiaall have made
advances(Asia 1996 1995;Naya andTan 1995;Robisonand
Goodman 1996). Now the leastdeveloped, transitionnations
in the region expect to sustain their gradualismpolicies. In
addition to obvious immediate economic incentives, such
strategic decision making also helps to diversify economic
risks and ultimately alleviate the consumer suffering and
potential social unrestthat can result when centralplanning
fails to deliver sufficient food and other subsistence-level
goods, as we are now seeing in North Korea, Asia's last
orthodox,centrallyplannedeconomy (Kim 1996).

MacroeconomicForces
Macroeconomicforces in the region tend to be shaped and
influenced by three factors: (1) ideology or the aforementioned politicalforces, which determinethe nature,structure,
and operationof the economic system, including for example, privatization,deregulation,trade, and investment policies; (2) the performanceof the system;and (3) the consumer
demandfor the productsand services withinand enabledby
the system. Privatization,a policy that encourages privatesector participationto eliminateor modify monopolyconditions and artificial preferences for public enterprises, is
instrumentalin solving the ownershipproblem(Rondinelli,
Nellis, and Cheema 1983). Accompaniedby deregulation,it
has increased the level of internalcompetition and placed
considerable pressure on previously protected institutions
such as telecoms and energy suppliers.The welcoming attitude to foreigninvestmentand the deregulationof tradehave
resulted in a high degree of interdependenceamong the
economies of the region. Sixty percentof the tradein Southeast Asia is intraregional,and this trendis growing at a rate
of 8.1% per year (Forbes 1995; Leger 1995). This interdependenceis being influencedby the pragmaticsearchfor new
venturesthatcontributeto the prosperityand securityof the
region.Concern,however, has been expressedthattradebarriers could be coming down much faster than is desired or
expected (Asian Business 1995), and domestic political realities could curb this general trend.The advance towardfree
trade,therefore,could be uneven,but it seems unlikelythatit
will be reversedpermanently.
Privatization, competition, and trade have stimulated
technology diffusion. Countriesthat were condemnedpreviously to low-technology, labor-intensive technologies are
now able to producesophisticatedhigh-technologyproducts
at low cost (Schwab and Smadja 1994), thus breakingthe
links between high technology, high productivity,high quality, and high wages. The policy of relying on cheap laborfor
competitive advantageis likely to lose favor. The laborcost
edge might be retained,in the short term vis-a-vis external
competition from the United States and Europe,but it is not
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a viable foundation for a sound future within the region,
where the flexible corporationcould move from Thailandto
China to Vietnam and so on. Moreover, in some of the
nations (e.g., Vietnam, Cambodia), labor cost advantages
seem to vanish in the realities of day-to-day business,
includingrent extractions,power shortages,and the like.
All the transition economies face problems creating
incentives to initiate and run efficient businesses and mobilize investment. There is no easy formula to solve these
problems, but gradual reform has permittedwealth to be
generated and protected, thus helping to create legal and
financial infrastructuresto expedite the reform process.
Moreover,families can "nest"capital, in essence becoming
mini-banksfrom which contiguous families or community
memberscan borrow.This practiceof informalsavings and
loan arrangementsamong families and friends is common
throughout Southeast Asia (e.g., Le Ngoc Hung and
Rondinelli 1993). Venturecapitalthencan be used for entrepreneurshipthat can deliver goods and services to pent-up
consumerdemand.Indeed,this new entrepreneur-consumer
relationshipseems to be a pillarof the marketizationrenaissance (United Nations 1993a). For example, in China, Deng
Xiaoping's reform policies permittedfarmers or entrepreneurs to achieve modest wealth by respondingto consumer
demand and thus contributing to national welfare; these
same policies enabled governmentto establish commercial
enterprises. Vietnamese leaders observed the outcomes in
China and implementedsimilar reforms.Initial Vietnamese
efforts were supportedby the countless small farmersand
small-scale entrepreneurs. In less than a decade SMEs
(small- to medium-sized enterprises)and privatized SOEs
(state-ownedenterprises)have become a dynamiceconomic
foundation for the nation (Shultz, Low, and Ardrey, in
press). Laos, Cambodia, and now Myanmarsubsequently
have enacted many of the macroeconomicreforms implementedin Chinaand Vietnam.Includedamong these are the
acceptanceof privatesector activity, the reversalof agriculturalcollectivization, a shift from centralplanningto a market economy, and the removal of price controls and subsidies to improve the countries' dismal economic performances. The economic development policies espoused by
government representatives from Laos (Alounkeo Kittikhoun 1995), Cambodia(Tan Savuth 1994), Vietnam (Le
Van Bang 1995), and Myanmar(Abel 1996) stress commitment to furtherreforms.
Vietnam,eventuallyCambodiaand Laos, and now Myanmar hope to follow China to the next step of more sophisticated entrepreneurialenterprises and the advent of industries whose products will be capable of competing in the
global market. Productivity and export measures indicate
thateach of these countrieshas made progressin these areas
(Asia 1996 1995). However, some Westernpolicy analysts
believe this evolutionary process ultimately is destined to
fail because they view "communist states" as inevitably
totalitarianin nature and therefore a deterrentto entrepreneurship(e.g., Goodman 1996). More thoughtfulanalysis of
recent trendstends to view marketsocialism more broadly,
that is, as a consolidation of power by a single party that
tries to mobilize and change society throughincentive structuresmanipulatedby revised, ideologically determinedstandardsof behavior. Marketsocialism has changed the incen-

tive structures to reward entrepreneurship,and entrepreneurs are now endemic to the countriesin transition.
Regardlessof the strengthof the entrepreneurialethos, we
cannot expect a far-reachingtransformationthat is national
in scope without political and economic linkages among the
powerful and influential nations that tend to harbor large
reserves of capital and expertise. Economic success stories
throughout Southeast Asia support this argument. By
accessing these reserves, former less-developed countries
have expedited the removal of many of the disabling conditions that nationalismand bureaucracyimpose on business
growth and created an ideological and economic environment that facilitates agendas among the power elite. The
market development that has spurred Southeast Asia's
recent growth probably would not have occurred without
arrangementsnegotiated at the highest level among entrepreneurs, bureaucraticchiefs, and foreign sources of aid,
investment, and markets (McVey 1992, p. 9). This lesson
has not been lost on the leaders of the region's transition
economies. Marketsocialists in Laos, Cambodia,Vietnam,
and the SLORC now accept this development requisite.
They increasinglywork to channelcitizens' energies toward
economic goals and to attract foreign investment capital,
while discouraging political reform. We have not yet seen
economic shock therapy as a mechanism to break down
these networks. Rather,these networks are used to induce
positive economic results. Not coincidentally, government
officials enjoy perks, promotions, and special investment
opportunities;they share in free marketeconomic successes
and become supportersof new small businesses in the areas
they control. Whethersuch favoritism can be sustainedhas
yet to be determined.Some have arguedthe region's transition economies eventually will be served betterby initiating
furtherreformsto decentralizeand allow even greaternumbers of entrepreneursto flourish (cf. United Nations 1993;
The Wall Street Journal 1996).

Social Forces
We temper the preceding discussion with a healthy respect
for social forces, which for reasonsof parsimonywe loosely
categorize as culture, interaction, and character. In these
conceptualizations, culture determines the most general,
enduring set of values within the community (cf. Goodenough 1971; Hofstede 1980). For example, the community
could value commerce, altruism, material possessions,
and/or formal education, or it could have shared values in
apposition to all or some of these constructs.Interaction is
used here as a term indicating the extent of the open or
closed natureof the society, that is, freedom of interaction.
Character is used to refer to the characteristicsof the society-for example, the demographicstructure.
The ethnocentric,uninitiatedobserverof the region could
use false broad categorizations such as "Asian" or "Chinese" to indicate a degree of homogeneity, which simply
does not exist in SoutheastAsia. Cultures,similarto nations,
are "imaginedcommunities"(Anderson 1995) among which
there exists a vast diversity within each of the nations even
without reference to national differences across Southeast
Asia. Although some countries (e.g., Cambodia) are more
culturallyhomogenous than others (e.g., Myanmar),within
all the nationsthereexist culturaldifferences (including lan-
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guage, religion, and ethnicity) that preclude a simple enumeration (cf. Parrinder1995). These differences present a
challenge to furtherprogressfor not only the region, but the
nations themselves. At an extreme level, cultural differences, as much as economic disparity,have played a significant role in the region's hostilities (e.g., Khmerattackson
Vietnamese fisherman in the Tonle Sap, Vietnamese
assaults on Cholon Chinese, SLORC's military engagements with Karenseparatists).However, it is also true that
some of the nationsin the region, at least on the surface,present a visible degree of cultural harmony and coexistence
(e.g., Singapore).Furthermore,the pragmatism,the positive
culturalattitudesto marketingand business, and the shared
educational experiences of some of the major cultural
groupingssuggest thata slow evolution towardculturalreconciliation is possible, especially if mutualbenefits of economic cooperationare to emerge. And though the underlying authoritarianpaternalismthat can make this possible is
sometimes repugnantto Westerners,there is an element of a
culturaltruthin the following statementby Lee Kuan Yew:

Myanmar,45.4 million; Philippines,68.7 million; Thailand,
59.4 million; and Vietnam,74 million). Some of the fastestgrowing populationsare also found in SoutheastAsia: Cambodia (9.9 million) and Laos (4.7 million) are both growing
at annualrates of 2.9% (CentralIntelligenceAgency 1994).
Moreover,the populace tends to be dispersedin ruralareas,
but an emerging rural-urbandrift is presentingmajorproblems. In many instances the movement from the countryto
the city has occurredtoo fast and has strainedthe socioeconomic infrastructure,leading to increased unemployment
and the development of slums and a disenfranchisedsegment of society. Furthermore,Williams (1995, p. 5) in a discussion of regional demographictrendshas stated that:

To thisday,the majorityof [SoutheastAsians]do not wantto
be activelyinvolvedin politicalparties....Whattheywantis to
havesomebodygoverningthemwell andproducingthingsthat
theywant(Kamm1995,p. 13).

This observation suggests that the burden of dependence
might be high, but because Southeast Asia's population
overall is younger than other partsof the world (more than
half of the people are under25 years of age, comparedwith
the United States, in which the proportionis about a third,
and Europe about a quarter)the demographicbase for furthereconomic growthalso exists. This is not to discountthat
the dynamics of the populationchanges are many-including migrationpatterns,fertility rates, and mortalityand life
expectancies-all of which are changing and will have an
impact on the development of the region. Other demographic problems include population shifts resulting from
the movement across bordersby "guest workers,"such as
prostitutes and child laborers, and the tragic plight of
refugees. Rising, balanced, long-term prosperity of the
regioncould providethe solution to manyof these problems.

Accordingly, the view thatthe economic progressof Southeast Asia is due to Confucian values of education, hard
work, thrift,and social orderhas much currencyin the East
and the West (cf. Robison and Goodman 1995, p. 3).
The existence of immigrant groups (e.g., the overseas
Chinese) and interactionamong culturesgenerallycan serve
as a culturalbridge between nations as well as a source of
investment capital (Kraar 1993). Unfortunately,ethnic and
political tensions still frequently impede investment from
groups most keen to invest. Viet Kieu (i.e., overseas Vietnamese with skills and capital) are often reluctantto return
because they remainfearfulof a policy reversalin Hanoi. A
similar problem exists for overseas Cambodians,Laotians,
and Burmese. Similarly,the Chinese Diasporaalso has contributedgreatly to the economy of Southeast Asia (Chang
1995, p. 955), thoughthey have not always been well treated
in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Taft
1994). Both the Chinese and Viet Kieu can be motivatedto
invest in Vietnam, for example-and some are investing
despite the cool reception by the government-but policy
reversals will make massive amounts of capital difficult to
attract.Therefore, the reform movement would be stunted
unless policies address cultural sensitivities and stimulate
cross-culturalinteractionand ultimately mutualgain.
With regardto the characterof the region, the evidence
suggests that,demographically,despite the need for caution
that prudentpragmatismdictates, the sheer weight of numbers will continue to propel furthergrowth. The size, density, and growth rates of Southeast Asia make it integralto
the global economic community.The region, depending on
which nationsare included,contains as much as 50% of the
world's populationwhile occupying only about 20% of the
total land mass. This statistic includes China, the world's
most populous nation, and five other nations with populations of more than 40 million (Indonesia, 199.7 million;
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AdministrationSystems
A modern state whose leaders hope to be competitive in a
global economy cannot progresswithout the existence of a
well-establishedandprotectedknowledgebase, institutionsto
createand disseminateknowledge,and an apparatusto manage knowledgeandotherresources.A reviewof Figure1 indicates we have subsumed these entities in "administration"
because, though each is administered interactively, their
mutualoutcomestendto be co-dependent,andthe contentand
processof each tend to be a functionof the precedingforces.

Knowledge System
The knowledge system is the source of collective wisdom
that ensures the transfer of experience and provides the
foundation for innovation and change. The three components of this system are (1) the extent to which knowledge
is well documented-that is, the degree to which knowledge
is stored and diffusion technology facilities are readily
available;(2) the degree to which it is independent-that is,
can be relied on to be objective and free of ideological influence; and (3) the degree to which it is applicableto market
developmentand transitioncontexts.
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All the transitionnationshave undergonea revolutionary
phase, during which deliberate and often uncontrolled
destruction of the historical knowledge base took place.
Some nations such as Cambodia are emerging from what
can only be describedas one of the most horrificsociopolitical experiments in the history of humanity, during which
almost a thirdof the populationand the entire intelligentsia
were lost (Chandler1992). Losses of this kind followed by
periods of strict censorship can cause irreparabledamage
not only in economic termsbut more importantlyto the collective psyche (Mydans 1996; Shenon 1995; Tith and Shultz
1996). Fortunately,the leadershipof even the most disadvantaged of these nations seems to be recognizing that a
nation cannot advance without a documented basis for
expertise (cf. Schultz 1960; Simon 1988) and that concentratedexperience (e.g., USAID and non-governmentalprojects in the forms of universityand librarydevelopmentand
visiting scholar programs), which facilitate the (re)establishment of recordedknowledge, is critical for the progress
of the region. Knowledge advancementand dissemination,
however, is anotheragendahotly contestedbetween reformers and conservatives.A problemfacing the reformersis the
capacity of the ideologically conservative group to block
reformby appealingto nationalismand the need to preserve
cultural purity (e.g., Nguyen Duy Khien 1996). Nevertheless, and regardlessof "need,"it will be increasingly difficult to restrictaccess to databasesand the flow of information throughinternationalnetworks.Moreover,it is evident
that all but the most dogged conservatives understandthat
competitive economies-and implicitly national strength
and independence-increasingly are linked to information
technologies. Consequently, major public policy initiatives
continue to be concernedwith the managementof the information technology boom.

EducationSystem
The institutionalconduit of knowledge will be an effective
education apparatus,and for economic transformationand
development to be successful, governments must place a
great emphasis on the productionof a trainedand educated
workforce(cf. Goh Keng Swee 1995, pp. 237-42). A macro
assessment would suggest that, essentially, this apparatus
consists of teaching, research, and practice. The practice
componentis emphasizedbecause commerceand marketing
are applied disciplines, and the test of the relevance of the
knowledge development and teaching and research efficiency is in the effectiveness of application.Governments
are facing some critical policy decisions that not only will
affect the education system, but will have long-term"ripple
effects" for the other administrationsystems. For example,
should provision of education be public or private? Who
should have access? Should the masteryof technical skills
be emphasized? Which if any national models are most
appropriate?There are many innovative possibilities in this
area, including distance education, hybrid models combining the best attributesof variousnationalsystems, as well as
a revolutionaryoption of unified regionalaction; but fundamentally,an educationsystem thatenables a comprehensive
and competitive knowledge system is critical.

Marketingand ExecutiveSystems
Knowledge and its advancement and dissemination will
have to be leveraged and managed in an effective administrative apparatus;therefore the final components are the
executive and marketing systems. Although we list these
systems separatelyin Figure 1, we discuss them under one
subheading because of the inherent role of executive and
managementdecision making to effective marketingpractice. Fundamentally,we refer to the professionalpracticeof
governmentand business marketingmanagement.The quality of it depends on the knowledge level of the executive/
managementpopulation, its motivation, and the extent to
which it actually implements modern marketingpractices.
In many respects the rapid growth among the transition
economies is evidence of a rudimentaryunderstandingof
marketingpractice.
The basic problem involves training a critical mass of
managersand executives capable of administeringorganizations that can compete in a global economy. Frequently,
even the most ambitious apparatchiksand budding executives have little knowledge of the philosophy and tools that
are conducive to successful marketing management. An
entire generation(or more) exists that has no knowledge of
anything but the communist system. Human resources,
therefore,are critical to transition.Returningnationalseducated in the West are an importantresource of marketing
skills. Furthermore,some reformershave the good fortune
to administernations whose citizens have firm recollections
of capitalist traditions (e.g., southern Vietnamese) and
therefore have been able to make more rapid transitions.
Another importantfactor has been a dedicated and trained
professional bureaucracy committed to economic reform
and armed with the knowledge required to work in or to
manage a marketing system effectively. Again, to use
China's transitionas an illustration,the reform movement
cultivated bureaucraticand even military allies to sustain
reformpolicies. Accumulatingwealth became not only permissible, but possible, as relevant stakeholders within the
public sector recognized politically correct opportunitiesto
prosperand maintainpower (Overholt 1993).
Transitionhas demonstratedthat,froma marcoperspective,
marketing involves the orchestrationof natural, political,
social, and macroeconomicforces to assist in the reconciliation of supplyanddemandthroughexchangeprocess(es).The
exchange or transactionis centralto the process (cf. Bagozzi
1975), and at the micro level it is criticalthat systems exist to
facilitateexchangesthatareexpectedto be voluntaryandbeneficial to all participants(e.g., MeadeandNason 1991). A role
of governmentis to assistthe unencumberedexchangeprocess
and to balanceits efficient and equitablefunctioning.Essentially, governmentsof SoutheastAsia's transitioneconomies
seem to have recognized grudgingly that the way forward
could be less intervention,which will enable marketingsystems to evolve and resultin consumerand societalbenefits.
Marketingalso involves managerialprocesses, however,
and it is at the micro level where the strongestreforms still
are needed, for whatever the ideological shift, further
progress cannot be made without changes to the corporate
structure.A cornerstoneof the Westernmarketingparadigm
is the so-called marketing concept (e.g., Kotler 1994),
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essentially, a normativephilosophical imperativeon which
modem marketingpractice is based. Paraphrased,the dictum is thatmarketingmanagersshould pursueprofitthrough
a consumer orientationand an integratedstrategy.The driving force behind the marketingsystem is consumerneeds,
the satisfactionof which leads to profit. In this can be seen
the critical error of controlled economies, whose raison
d'etre to increase the material welfare of their people was
exemplary, but who failed because of their disregard for
marketingmanagementprinciples.In addition,the failureto
emphasize profit as a fundamentaldriving force of business
doomed many of these nations to poverty because of the
inevitable lack of capital for reinvestment. Moreover,
thoughmarketadvocatestendedto emphasizeprice, in practice many problemsarose not so much from prices and price
setting but rather from profit and its distribution. Profit,
which is too often viewed as "exploitative,"could be viewed
more accurately as a performanceindicator; but in these
nations profitgenerallywas regardedas a capitalistevil and
thereforeas having no functionin a socialist economy. Even
when a corporationenjoyed a surplus, its disposition was
controlledby the government(the party),whose investment
decisions were dominatedby political power and ideological considerations rather than by national economic concerns and individualcorporateor consumerwelfare.
Policies in relation to other marketing functions were
based on a poor understandingof marketingtheoryand were
too often openly hostile to marketing practice. Marketing
communicationsprovides a good example. In China, advertising was undertight statecontroluntil reformerssuggested
thatadvertisingcould be instrumentalto the reciprocalrelationship between consumption and production and might
prove to be an importantcatalyst to economic development,
and therefore was not as subversive as was thought previously (Swanson 1990). Since the reforms, the growth of
advertising expenditurehas been exponential, culminating
with US$860 million in the first half of 1994-a 73%
increase from the previous year (Simons 1994)-and has
sparkedkeen interestamong academics(cf. Pollay, Tse, and
Wang 1990; Semenik, Zhou, and Moore 1986; Swanson
1990; Tse, Belk, and Zhou 1989; Zhou and Belk 1993).
Indeed, promotionis a well-developed marketingmix element in many of the transition economies and has been
instrumentalto successful marketpenetrationand consumer
decision making in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,and Vietnam, as well as in China. It has become so effective that it
has been regarded as a contributing factor to Vietnam's
social evils campaign (Vietnam Business Journal 1996, p.
16) and SLORC's decision to regulatetightly-through the
Ministry of Information-all advertising content, media,
and timing.
Product policy, as with other elements, also was controlled centrally. It was the responsibilityof technical productioncadresguided by partyideologues. Industrialization
schemes funded by a strong agriculturalsector forced a
focus on commodity and heavy-industry production. An
implication is the utter disregard for marketing research.
This importantfunctionwas virtuallynonexistentin most of
the controlled-cum-transitioneconomies, and marketing
researchagencies are only just beginning to appearin, for
example, Laos and Myanmar. The general ignorance of
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marketingand in particularconsumer behavior as well as
the lack of infrastructuredevelopment had some disastrous
consequences such as famine (e.g., Karnow 1991, p. 43).
Poor developmentof distributionand transportationinfrastructure contributed-and continues to contribute-to
these problems. Further economic progress cannot be
achieved without a rapid developmentof distributionchannels. For example, Myanmar,which is approximately25%
largerthan Thailand,has approximately40% fewer kilometers of highway (Central Intelligence Agency 1994). Seaports in Vietnam are in disrepairor incapableof unloading
large containerships (GeneralStatisticsOffice 1995); Cambodia's countrysideis pocked with explosive ordnance,and
Laos has underdevelopedrail and highway conduits (Asian
Development Bank 1993; Economist Intelligence Unit
1994b; InternationalMonetaryFund 1994).
These are but a few examples of the importanceof marketing mix variablesto the economic and social success of
transitioneconomies. In short, strategically managing the
marketing mix is paramountto the long-term success of
government run firms and organizationsand to the newly
privatized or emerging private-sector firms, sustainable
growth, and consumer welfare. And though this thought
might be painfully obvious to marketingpractitioners,policy analysts, and scholars in establishedmarketeconomies,
it is still frequentlylost on manyof the policymakersin transition economies.

Discussion
Policy and Welfare Outcomes
We suggest that the Southeast Asian model of transition
demonstratesan effective sensitivityto the complex interactions of many forces and systems. In so doing, it enablesthe
changeprocessto buildthe necessaryinstitutions,while avoiding fataldamageto pricestability,social harmony,or political
supportfor futurereform.The modelcertainlyis not flawless,
but the Chineseexperienceand morerecentlythe experiences
in Vietnam,Cambodia,Laos, and Myanmarhave shown that
a centrallyplannedeconomic systemcan adoptrudimentsof a
marketsystem without an interveningsocial catastrophe-a
conclusionthatwould be muchin doubtif these countrieshad
pursued the shock therapy strategies favored in Eastern
Europe,which antagonizedtoo many groupssimultaneously,
incitedopposition,andultimatelystymiedtransition(cf. Goldman 1991; Overholt 1993, p. 46). The essence of successful
reformpolicies is usuallya willingnessor abilityto divide the
process into manageablephases and build a political constituencyof supporterswho see reformas serving their interests. Therefore,shock therapy,in which political reformoutpaces economic reform,has led many observersto conclude
"an effective transitionto the marketsystem can be possible
only in the contextof economic development... [and]on the
creationof new capacitiesandnot only-or primarily-on the
dismantlingof the old capacities"(UnitedNations 1992, p. 3).
Throughout the process political pluralism has been
rejectedby the SoutheastAsians, or at least SoutheastAsian
governments. SLORC and the "Communist"parties, promoting theirsoftened authoritarianismratherthandraconian
political repression,remainin control. Moreover,their governmentshave been able to reduce inflationto tolerablelev-
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els, while improvinglife quality for many of their citizens.
In countrieswhere gross domestic productper capitahovers
around $200 to $600, and the slightest improvements
become apparent,it would seem thatthe majorityof citizens
believe political pluralismcan wait as long as the transition
process producesimprovementsin living standardsacross a
broad social spectrum of consumers. By delivering the
goods, literally and figuratively, the leaders of Southeast
Asia's transitioneconomies are hopeful that they can avoid
social and economic disintegration.At this juncture-and
certainly relative to conditions a decade ago-it would not
be unreasonableto conclude that gradualismin the form of
market socialism has been "successful" because it has
helped to balance macroeconomicforces, political control,
and societal welfare.
Having rejectedrapidreforms and Westernpolitical values, the leaders of Southeast Asia's transition economies
look to Chinaand, increasingly,Singaporeas models to sustain their transformations.Given extant resources and by
orchestratingpolitical, marcoeconomic, and social forces
the countries are designing administration systems that
interact with marketing systems to produce impressive
growth figures and some positive consumeroutcomes. Yet,
we contend these countrieseventually will hit what we call
the "transitionwall"-flattening growthcurves, competition
for investmentcapital, and a more informedconsumersociety that will become impatient with gradualism. Hence,
more expansive policies to introduce new technologies,
access to information,and greaterprivatesector controlwill
be requiredif leaders hope to enable furthergrowth, global
competitiveness, and the most optimal outcomes for consumers. These more expansive policies also will stimulate
informationdisseminationand greaterpressuresfor political
reform, or, depending on a country's orientation,"corrupting influences" such as Western ideas encouraging iconoclasm, nonconformity,and dissent.

Marketing Implications
Leaders of the transitioneconomies will try to administer
the forces and systems presentedin Figure 1 by replicating
many of the policy formulas that spurredgrowth in other
parts of Southeast Asia: relatively stable political environments, guided marketeconomies, foreign investment,cheap
labor, and export development.They also will try to access
expertise and management practices, not only from their
more wealthy regionalneighbors,but fromothernationsand
sources as well. These contingencies create promising
opportunities for marketers in the areas of education,
energy, transportation,construction, consumer and industrial products, and communication. The consumer base
alreadyexists and is awesome, and thoughthe consumersin
the transitioneconomies are generally poor and "unsophisticated," this too is changing. An increase already has
occurred in domestic consumptiondue to the emergence of
a middle class with activatedneeds, rising expectations,and
the disposable income to spend for their satisfaction. The
marketingand consumptionconditionsexploding in Ho Chi
Minh City, Yangon, Mandalay,Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and the cities of southernand coastal China are precursorsof events to come and indicatorsof the possibilities.
The sheer potential of these countrieshas inspiredmassive

foreign investment and multilateralaid. These trends now
force marketersto consider whether they can afford not to
be in these markets.
The benefits of participationcould augment a regional
strategy. Firms can protect internationalmarket share and
capitalize on the strength of regional movements, such as
ASEAN, the GreaterMekong Subregion,and the pandemic
emergence of consumer culture. These movements will
inspire furthercooperation and some standardization.Ultimately, strategic participation must consider corporate
ambitions, position, resources, and organization, while
focusing on specific transitioneconomies and also diverse,
arcane conditions within these countries (cf. Lasserre and
Schiitte 1995, p. 24).
It is important to strive for multi-stakeholderbenefits
from investment. Interviews with government authorities
and investors in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,and Vietnam
indicate none of the governmentswant transitionto culminate in theircountriesbecoming little more thanexport markets for other countries' consumer and industrialproducts.
Instead they seek mutually beneficial projects. This objective affects marketing practices, which are encouraged to
ensure successful transitionand profitable ventures. More
specifically, marketers are encouraged to stimulate economic growth and, ideally, to improve living standardsfor
the largest number of people. Governments provide tax
incentives, favorable locations, and other incentives for
firms that initiate projects with mutually beneficial outcomes. Types of projectsmost frequentlymentionedinclude
all facets of infrastructuredevelopment, particularlytransportation, sanitation, and telecommunications;agricultural
marketing;manufacturingfacilities; and value-addedindustries. In short, projects that build or restore infrastructure,
develop naturaland humanresources,sharetechnology, and
develop export marketingreceive considerablesupportfrom
multilateralaid sources and local authorities.More recently,
projects that facilitate sustainablegrowth and development
have been favored.
The opportunitiesin transitionalSoutheast Asia are not
without risks. The administrativeand organizationalproblems are immense and, withoutresolution,could destroy the
potential. Balancing marketerinterests with ongoing legal
and political constraints,environmentand culturepreservation, and the growing demandsof a voraciousconsumerculture will be extraordinarilydifficult. These nations need not
only capital, goods, and services but assistance in developing a new form of marketingsystem. Legal and financial
institutions are inadequate;human resources typically are
ill-equipped to prosper in a complex marketing system.
Investors therefore might need to provide assistance in
developing all elements of the model illustratedin Figure 1.
Indeed,administeringa comprehensivestrategyis the greatest challenge confronting marketers. The labor force,
including managers, has little knowledge about or experience with the marketing practices of the West or Asia's
developed economies. This is particularlytrue in newly privatized firms in which the personnel were, in effect, political appointments.So, a marketingexecutive could have several roles to play. He or she might be requiredto develop
specific strategies for successful marketentry, assist in the
creation of an enabling environmentin which business can
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flourish, restructure the organization, train employees,
and/orestablish a marketingethos within the organization.
Political and social institutions throughout Southeast
Asia's transitioneconomies are becoming more marketing
friendly, thus enabling marketingand executive systems to
be more efficient and effective. Local workforcesordinarily
are very keen to work for internationalfirms and masterthe
skills requiredto succeed in marketingorganizations.And
governmentsdo want investors to succeed, within the context of win-win outcomes. "Moremarketingfriendly,"however, is a relative description. Corruptionand rent extractions are still common, employees must be trained to perform the most basic business tasks, and marketersgenerally
are asked to succeed in a marketingenvironmentin which
the rules are changing as the game is being played. These
pitfalls are the very natureof transition.In summary,marketing in these countrieshas been likened to playing football
with moving goal posts: Just when it seems one is about to
score, a new law is passed, policy shifts, bureaucratsinterfere, electricityfails, ordersare delayed, the distributionnetwork collapses, and so on-that is, the goal posts move.
Because of this unpredictabilityand uncertainty,successful
marketershave added prudence,patience, and perseverance
to the marketingmix (Shultz and Ardrey 1997).

Future Research Directions
SoutheastAsia's transitioneconomies are uniqueliving laboratories in which to study the dynamic interaction of
socioeconomic policy change, marketing,and consumption.
We proposea model to explain the foundationsof transition.
In light of the analysis and discussion presented here, we
believe the following suggestions are the most compelling
researchopportunities.
The model is not exhaustive, and furtherdevelopment is
appropriate.This could include, first, discussion and expansion of the foundations.Second, empiricaltests of the relationships among the variousforces, factors,and systems are
needed. Empirical testing could include within-country
analyses, but cross-culturaland internationalcomparisons
would be especially fruitful.These efforts would enable us to
determinewhich variablesand combinationsof variablesare
most likely to contributeto individualand societal prosperity. To thatend, perhapsthe single most compellingdirection
for furtherresearchwould includemoreexpansiveconceptualizations and operationalizationsof the construct-welfare
outcomes. We have selected this descriptor purposely to
stimulatethinkingbeyondthe morenormativeand restrictive
terms--development and progress-which connote economic gains andtypicallyaremeasuredby economic growth,
inflationrates,per capitaincome, and purchasingpower parity. Materialpossessions, as measuredby some sort of standard package (cf. Keyfitz 1982), are also fairly typical. We
encouragemarketingscholarsand policy analyststo consider
broaderlife qualitymeasures,including,for example, health
and wellness indicators, literacy, anomie, angst, social
mobility, and perhapssocial harmonyand cultural(dis)integration(cf. Belk 1988, pp. 118-22; DholakiaandFirat1988).
We submit that if governments, societies, consumers, and
marketers accept that Southeast Asian transition is both
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inevitable and desirable, it behooves all of us to determine
what will be its long-termand far-reachingeffects.
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